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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 16, Number 4, Part 1 (October 29, 2009) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Russia’s rock and hard place 
Mixed signals have been emanating from Russia’s diarchical clans for months, 
and recently, some regime-approved opposition parties apparently thought that 
they had picked up on a call for action and staged a demonstration against 
regional and local elections, and more specifically, against Putin’s party of power, 
United Russia.  Unfortunately, it appears either that the parties’ leaders read the 
signals wrong, or perhaps that they took their protest too far.  Now, Kremlin 
political strategist Vladislav Surkov has had to speak publicly, without nuance, to 
explain that there are limits to democracy in Russia and why. 
 
The core concern is the nature and function of Russia’s transitional democracy.  
It has been fewer than twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as 
Russia broke through the snare of the Union center, with its single party-
dominated rule of the CPSU.  During that twenty years, Russia has experienced 
extremes of idealism and hope, disappointment, chaos, renewal, war, terrorism, 
an imposed vertical of power, economic regeneration, economic crisis, the re-
creation of the super party state, and a sad mockery of transition in the hand-
picked successor to a presidency hamstrung by its former occupant (appearing in 
an unforgettable role as prime minister).  The tandem partnership, sponsored by 
then President Putin, is a fundamentally unstable and unproductive political 
structure designed to allow the Kremlin’s former occupant to appear to obey 
constitutional injunctions on his presidential terms, and yet to position himself 
close enough to the center of power to allow his authority to redesign the system 
and recast his role in it. 
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Events were progressing swimmingly in the faux-transition, until economic 
decline, accelerated in Russia by the aftereffects of its behavior in Georgia in 
August 2008, was set atumble with the rest of the world in September 2008.  
Suddenly, the bulging coffers of cash that smoothed economic and political 
bumps were disappearing.  Putin’s first response was to blame the West for 
initiating the crisis (ignoring the steep declines caused by Russia’s own actions in 
August), thus conjuring a foreign threat that allegedly attempts to keep Russia 
weak.  As it quickly became clear that Russia could experience dramatic social 
unrest caused by the economic turnabout, Putin seemed to refocus his efforts on 
staving off the worst effects of the crisis.  There is some speculation that Putin’s 
actions have been unsuccessful and that decisive action is still required on the 
economic front.  
 
It is within this context that the design of the diarchy, conceived in flush, energy-
rich times, appears poised to present a challenge to the prime minister who 
would be president…again. 
 
In August, President Medvedev published a “Manifesto,” which starkly portrayed 
the deficits facing Russia, including “its humiliating dependence on raw materials. 
(…) To sum up, an inefficient economy, semi-Soviet social sphere, fragile 
democracy, negative demographic trends, and unstable Caucasus represent 
very big problems….” (1) 
 
Medvedev’s critique seemed in stark contrast to Prime Minister Putin’s steadfast 
approach.  Despite convivial photo sessions published for mass consumption, 
there appeared to be tension building in the diarchy.  The past few weeks, 
however, have provided the clearest glimpses of competition brewing between 
the teeter-tottering tandem chiefs.  
 
Earlier this month, regional and local elections across Russia were reported to 
have brought an expected strong showing for United Russia.  (For more on these 
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elections, please see “Domestic Issues” below.)  The presumption of a United 
Russia victory was strong; how it might have been attained was left 
uncontemplated.  Until, that is, the so-called loyal opposition parties staged a 
walkout of parliament in protest at the conduct of the elections and, more 
pointedly, the vote tabulation.  
 
The actions of the leaders of the Communist Party, The Liberal Democratic Party 
of Russia (LDPR), and a Just Russia brought almost unprecedented attention to 
the conduct of elections in Russia.  The stunning walkout (a clear and very public 
assault on the party of power) fueled speculation that the Kremlin might have 
encouraged, or planned, the event.  If so, had the president himself proposed the 
action to challenge the prime minister?  There is but one real candidate in the 
Kremlin who possibly could have orchestrated such a protest:  Vladislav Surkov, 
author of the “Sovereign Democracy” concept, party politics specialist, and 
general ideologist both to Medvedev and Putin before him. 
 
“Surkov runs the virtual world of Russian democracy,” according to Mikhail 
Kasyanov, the former prime minister and putative presidential candidate. “He is 
the main functionary of the imitation of politics in Russia. The imitation of political 
parties, the imitation of elections, the imitation of political pluralism.” (2) 
 
The opposition leaders demanded a meeting with President Medvedev to discuss 
allegations of fraud in the elections.  On October 24, President Medvedev met 
with them, but recast the agenda as a “free discussion” in “preparation of the 
Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.” (3) 
 
The day before, Medvedev also held a meeting that reportedly involved a 
discussion of his draft speech to parliament and the comments received from his 
“Go, Russia!” manifesto.  In this case, the attendance was quite different: “Taking 
part in the meeting were Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei 
Naryshkin, his deputies Vladislav Surkov and Alexei Gromov, Deputy Prime 
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Ministers Igor Shuvalov, Alexander Zhukov, Alexei Kudrin and Sergei Sobyanin, 
presidential aides, Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, and Deputy Foreign 
Minister Sergei Ryabkov.” (4)  It seems likely that in addition to the details of his 
speech, Medvedev, his advisers and key government ministers discussed the 
ramifications of the opposition walkout and allegations of fraud in the elections. 
 
Within days, the traditionally press-reticent Surkov granted an interview to Itogi 
during which he plainly set out the problems of democratic and economic 
development in Russia, “If we remain a raw material power, we are doomed to 
stagnation. In principle, the problem consists not only of the primitive nature of a 
raw material economy, of its weakness and vulnerability. There is also a political 
aspect to this. (…) Our task is to prove a simple idea to ourselves: That we can 
modernize by relying on democratic institutions. But here, it is important not to 
frighten the liberal, democratic society with chaos and disorder.” (5) 
 
“[W]e must know that unconsolidated and unbalanced power and weak 
democratic institutions are not capable of ensuring economic uplift. Even now, 
when power is sufficiently consolidated and regulated, many projects are 
proceeding very slowly and with difficulty. If we add to this some kind of political 
instability, then our development would simply be paralyzed. There will be much 
demagoguery, much prattle, much lobbying and rending of Russia apart piece by 
piece, but there would not be development.” (6) 
 
Surkov’s comments are a straightforward indictment of Russia’s current 
circumstances, and therefore could be seen as a critique even of Putin.  Certainly 
some analysts have suggested the possibility of Surkov laying the groundwork 
for a clash of clans, siloviki vs. civiliki. (7)  
 
Nonetheless, Surkov’s appearance well may have been the result of the 
unintended consequences of the walkout by the Duma opposition parties.  As 
soon as the election results were called into question formally and in such a 
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public way, stories proliferated about the oddities of ballot counting, including the 
fact that ballots counted in the Khamovniki District, where Sergei Mitrokhin, the 
head of the Yabloko party resides, turned up no votes for that party.  A ballot 
recount was ordered.  (8) 
 
The public discussion of fraudulent elections and the details of ballot irregularities 
clearly damages the image and reputation of United Russia, as well as the prime 
minister who heads the party.  Even if a rivalry between Kremlin and government 
clans was leading to full battle, it seems unlikely that the Kremlin would begin the 
battle by such a direct attack on Putin.  
 
It seems feasible that any signals sent from the Kremlin to suggest action by the 
Duma opposition parties, were not intended to produce quite so flamboyant an 
action or response.  Surkov’s warning against the dangers of too much 
democracy and the potential for a return to chaos likely was a carefully crafted 
message meant to calm turbulent waters.  The problem for the Kremlin, even 
more so for Putin, is that the genie of criticism has been unleashed, and in the 
next elections, if at all legitimate, United Russia might suffer dramatically. 
 
Surkov’s remarks in the interview indeed were pointed, but speak to a larger 
quandary that has bedeviled Russia and many other states.  Notably, analysts 
foreign and domestic seem to have heard his main thesis:  Russia needs to 
modernize and to liberalize, but it cannot risk the chaos of similar attempts in the 
1990s.  This is not a new proposition; even during the Yel’tsin years, many 
voices recommended the “Chinese model” of economic reform that eschewed 
dramatic political reforms in favor of incremental economic moves.  The 
conundrum Surkov laid out is familiar both to Russians and to other transitional 
regimes contemplating reform:  To modernize economically requires more 
freedom of action to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation; more freedom 
of action requires looser governmental control.  What is the balance between 
progress and order? 
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Source Notes: 
(1) Text of Dmitry Medvedev’s Article, Go Russia!, 10 Sep 09, Russian 
Pesident’s Website via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml.  
See further discussion of Medvedev’s manifesto in previous ISCIP Analysts. 
(2) “Politics: Influential scriptwriter directs from backstage,” By Charles Clover, 
Financial Times Online, 13 Oct 09 via http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/74c3d38a-b6c3-
11de-8a28-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1. 
(3) “Dmitry Medvedev met with leaders of political parties represented in the 
Duma,” 24 Oct 09, Russian President’s Website via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/news/2009/10/222335.shtml. 
(4) “Dmitry Medvedev discussed the drafting of the Presidential Address to the 
Federal Assembly (parliament) with Presidential Executive Office senior officials 
and Government Cabinet members,” 19 Oct 09, Russian President’s Website via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/sdocs/news.shtml?month=10&day=&year=2009&Submit.x=
3&Submit.y=10&prefix=&value_from=&value_to=&date=&stype=&dayRequired=
no&day_enable=true#. 
(5) Interview with Vladislav Surkov, First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff, 
Deputy Chairman of the President's Commission on Modernization and 
Technological Development of the Economy, conducted by correspondent 
Aleksandr Chudodeyev: "Renew Yourselves, Gentlemen!" Itogi, 26 Oct 09 via 
Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 2009-#198, 28 Oct 09. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) See Stratfor.com: The Kremlin Wars (Special Series), Part 3:Rise of the 
Civiliki, 26 Oct 09 stratfor.com via JRL, 2009-#197, 27 Oct 09; also, drawing on 
the Stratfor report, see “A Kremlin Marriage of Convenience,” By Brian Whitmore, 
27 Oct 09. The Power Vertical blog; RFE/RL.org via 
http://www.rferl.org/archive/The_Power_Vertical/latest/884/884.html. 
(8) “Election inconsistencies to no effect,” Russia Today, 23 Oct 09 via 
http://russiatoday.com/Politics/2009-10-23/court-orders-ballot-recount.html. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
A funeral for democracy? 
Few were surprised when United Russia easily swept the local and regional 
elections that were held across Russia earlier this month, winning more than 
7,000 local election contests on October 11. (1) At first, it appeared that these 
victories simply confirmed what many already had predicted: the Russian people 
continues to trust in the leaders that have navigated the country (relatively 
successfully) through more than a year of global economic instability. Shortly 
after the results were announced, however, prominent opposition leaders began 
to accuse Russia’s Central Election Committee (CEC) of ballot tampering and 
electoral fraud. These protests have continued to grow stronger and more 
persistent. 
 
Accusations of election fraud would be easy to ignore if it was only the opposition 
that was making them. Independent election monitoring organization Golos 
conducted its own investigation and reported electoral irregularities across the 
country. The fight between the opposition parties and the Kremlin came to a 
head on October 14 when 135 members of the 450-seat Duma staged an 
unprecedented walk-out during a meeting of the lower house of parliament. The 
parties involved—the Communists, the Liberal Democratic Party and A Just 
Russia—traditionally have been considered pro-Kremlin, but their loyalty has 
decreased sharply recently. For the Liberal Democrats and A Just Russia, the 
protest only lasted two days, but the Communists refused to return until 
President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to a meeting. (3) The Communists (with the 
support of the Liberal Democrats and Yabloko) also organized protests in 
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Russia’s largest cities. In Moscow alone, there were more than 1,500 supporters. 
(4) However, United Russia continues to control the Duma with 315 seats, while 
the next most-represented party is the Communists, with only 57 seats. 
 
Although the various ongoing protests have done little to change the status quo, 
apparently they were sufficient to convince Medvedev to meet with party leaders 
last Saturday. This meeting was not a conciliatory gesture, however. Speaking at 
a pre-meeting press conference, the president was quick to clarify that the 
meeting’s only purpose was to diffuse the situation and convince the opposition 
MPs to return to the Duma. Medvedev did acknowledge that there might have 
been some election irregularities. According to Liberal Democratic Party leader 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the president “agreed that not everything was clean, and 
that there were probably violations which should be investigated … using legal 
procedures.” (6) He reportedly also was open to discussing how the opposition 
leadership could modify election law to prevent similar issues in the future. (7) 
Despite these apparent admissions, however, publicly Medvedev continues to 
contend that the elections were legal and has refused to entertain demands for 
any wide-scale recount. (8) 
 
One limited, court-ordered recount of polling station 192 found that sixteen votes 
for Yabloko had been misplaced. They were found in piles of votes for the 
Communist Party along with votes for Russia’s Liberal Democratic party and the 
Patriots of Russia party. Interestingly, the original election results from that 
particular polling station had listed no votes for Yabloko. (9) The recount was 
ordered after Sergei Mitrokhin, Yabloko’s leader, threatened legal action when he 
was informed that no one in his own district had voted for the party. Mitrokhin 
claimed fraud on the basis that his and his wife’s votes went uncounted. (10) The 
results of this recount have spurred Mitrokhin to push harder for all the votes to 
be declared invalid. (11) As he told the press, “Our goal is to force a full 
cancellation of the results of the election and the appointment of a new date for 
polling. (12) 
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The other opposition parties have issued somewhat less drastic demands. 
Zhirinovsky has called for the nullification of all results from Moscow, the Tula 
Region, and Mari El, three polling stations at which recounts have shown voting 
discrepancies. His party also wants United Russia party leader Boris Gryzlov to 
step down. The Communist party, on the other hand, wants Vladimir Churov, 
chairman of the CEC, to resign, along with the governor of Mari El. Zhirinovsky 
also demanded that Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Tula Regional Governor 
Vyacheslav Dudka be fired. However, according to Churov, none of the body’s 
members can be fired without a court ruling that they committed fraud or 
otherwise violated the election laws. (13) 
 
The response to the opposition’s criticism has been mixed. Former Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev called the election “a mockery of democracy” that “discredited 
Russia's political system.” (14) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, 
quickly dismissed the issue, telling reporters “losers always [feel] offended.” (15) 
United Russia’s Gryzlov, the current speaker of the Duma, maintains that any 
recount would only waste time. Gryzlov argues that there cannot be more than a 
one or two percent margin of error, and therefore, any power gained by the 
opposition as a result of a recount would be negligible. (16) 
 
Although a thorough, unbiased recount might not dramatically alter election 
results, it could prove disastrous for United Russia and the government, as more 
and more people are beginning to compare the current government to its Soviet 
predecessor. (18) The opposition would gain a few more seats, but more 
importantly, the moral victory from proving that, yet again, the government has 
gone to extreme lengths to maintain control even as it attempts to pass the 
results off as a democratic victory. It also could use the current confusion as 
leverage against Medvedev, who campaigned on the promise of greater 
democracy and pluralism. Without a recount, the opposition parties are left with 
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even less representation and the looming threat that they may be without a voice 
in Russian politics in the near future. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Douglas Birch, “Russian president defends vote that helped Kremlin,” 
Associated Press, 24 Oct 09 via 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hlbs2D5e1RKjkSkM_dcNc
7LeknEwD9BHJ3V80. Last accessed 25 Oct 09. 
(2) “Medvedev meets faction leaders in conciliatory move,” Reuters via The 
Peninsula On-Line, 25 Oct 09 via 
http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=World_News&sub
section=United+Kingdom+%26+Europe&month=October2009&file=World_News
200910251725.xml. Last accessed 25 Oct 09. 
(3) “Russia: Hundreds protest in Moscow over elections,” Israel News, 22 Oct 09 
via http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3794075,00.html. Last accessed 
25 Oct 09. 
(4) “Medvedev meets faction leaders in conciliatory move,” Ibid. 
(5) “Medvedev says parliamentary election results to stand – Zhirinovsky,” RIA 
Novosti, 24 Oct 09 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20091024/156577750.html. Last 
accessed 25 Oct 09. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) “Medvedev meets faction leaders in conciliatory move,” Ibid. 
(8) “Moscow Precinct Recount Reveals Vote-Count Errors,” Radio Free Europe / 
Radio Liberty, 23 Oct 09 via 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Moscow_Precinct_Recount_Reveals_VoteCount_Err
ors/1859569.html. Last accessed 25 Oct. 
(9) Connor Sweeney, “Call for new Moscow poll after votes disappear,” Reuters, 
23 Oct 09 via 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE59M3A620091023. Last 
accessed 25 Oct 09. 
(10) “Moscow Precinct Recount Reveals Vote-Count Errors,” Ibid. 
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(11) Sweeney, Ibid. 
(12) “Medvedev says parliamentary election results to stand – Zhirinovsky,” Ibid. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) Sweeney, Ibid. 
(15) “Russian Duma Speaker Says No Need For Recount,” Radio Free Europe / 
Radio Liberty, 22 Oct 09 via 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Duma_Speaker_Says_No_Need_For_Reco
unt/1858257.html. Last accessed 25 Oct 09. 
(16) Sweeney, Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Andrew Wallace (USAF) 
 
Russia’s new defense law & draft military doctrine  
Over the past two months, Russia has introduced two new initiatives to bolster its 
options to exercise military force at home and abroad.  First, in early August, 
President Medvedev submitted a new amendment to the Duma proposing to 
expand the President’s authority to conduct military operations abroad in order to 
defend Russian national interests.  Second, the Russian Security Council 
recently unveiled a more expansive set of conditions under which nuclear 
weapons may be employed to include “regional” and “local” wars.  Although both 
initiatives appear to signal a more aggressive military posture, Russian Foreign 
Minister Lavrov said, “…no-one, particularly our Ukrainian friends, should have 
reason for concern.” (1)  Despite such assurances, these initiatives highlight 
Russia’s interest in maintaining a dominant presence within its “near abroad” and 
in maintaining an assertive military posture. 
 
Russian President Medvedev proposed the first initiative on August 10 by 
introducing a new amendment to the Duma expanding the Russian President’s 
authority to use the nation’s armed forces beyond the country’s borders. (2)  On 
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October 23, the Russian Duma gave final approval to the President’s new 
amendment. (3)  According to the Head of the State Duma Committee on 
Defense Viktor Zavarzin, “The new law will allow Russia to react without delay to 
possible threats to its national security.” (4)  Chairman of the Federal Council 
Committee on International Affairs Mikhail Margelov said, “The bill envisages a 
wide range of circumstances which may require operational interference from 
Russian troops….the protection of our citizens, no matter how far away they may 
be from native borders [is] a priority.” (5) 
 
Russian politicians and military leaders indicated that the Georgian-Russian 
conflict of 2008 provided a significant impetus for change, (6)  as previous 
legislation had limited the President’s authority to employ armed forces outside 
Russian territory. (7)  The new law greatly expands upon the old and authorizes 
the President to use the armed forces “to counter an attack against Russian 
Armed Forces or other troops deployed beyond Russia’s borders; to counter or 
prevent an aggression against another country; to protect Russian citizens 
abroad; to combat piracy and ensure safe passage of shipping.” (8)  Accordingly, 
the legal foundation for Russian intervention in armed conflicts, such as the one 
in Georgia last year, will be greatly expanded. 
 
The protection of “Russian citizens abroad” clause has alarmed Russia’s closest 
neighbors.  Acting First Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Yuriy 
Kostenko expressed concern about the potential for Russian military interference 
on behalf of Russian citizens in Ukraine. (9)  After consulting with Russia, 
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Poroshenko later indicated he was “satisfied” with 
Russia’s explanation of the new law. (10)  Regardless, Russian military pundits 
believe that the law is in line with a more “active” Russian foreign policy and 
provides the Russian executive with the power to go to war “whenever it wants.” 
(11) 
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In early October, Russian Security Council Secretary Patrushev proposed 
significant changes to Russia’s current military doctrine. (12)  The military and 
the Security Council currently are reviewing the draft document before submitting 
it to the Russian President (anticipated at year’s end).  According to Secretary 
Patrushev, the new doctrine will include preemptive nuclear strike options as well 
as “amended” conditions for large-scale, regional and local nuclear strikes. (13)  
The 2000 version of Russia’s military doctrine stated, “Russia reserves the right 
to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of 
weapons of mass destruction against it and [or] its allies as well as in response to 
large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the 
national security of the Russian Federation.” (14)  
 
The potential expansion of Russia’s nuclear options for use in local and regional 
conflicts, as well as for preemption, foreshadows a more assertive military 
doctrine.  It also may attest to Russia’s insecurity vis-à-vis its conventional force 
structure.  According to the former Chief of the Main Staff of Russian Strategic 
Missile Troops Col-Gen Yesin, “Russia…does not possess sufficient potential of 
general purpose troops comparable with NATO’s arsenal.” (15)  This perceived 
imbalance could be exacerbated by further reductions in Russian Army 
personnel and may be providing the motivation to bolster its nuclear deterrent 
posture. (16) 
 
News of Russia’s draft military doctrine has caused serious concern in Georgia.  
Georgian Foreign Minister Vashadze said, “Threatening with nuclear weapons in 
case of local conflicts is a manifestation of extreme weakness, confusion, and the 
lack of international policy.” (17)  In addition, members of the British parliament’s 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee recently asked the Speaker of the Ukrainian 
Parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn about the possibility of a Ukraine-Russia conflict in 
Crimea similar to the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.  Speaker Lytvyn responded, 
“The repetition of something similar is absolutely impossible in Crimea.” (18)  
Even though Speaker Lytvyn discounts the possibility, the committee members’ 
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question highlights the concern other states may have regarding how Russia will 
pursue its interests in its “near abroad.” 
 
In a recent interview, Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov stated, “when Russia 
began to be guided by its national interests, many did not like it, especially those 
states which felt in the early 90’s that we would now be a mere part of the 
West…[that] would be naïve.” (19)  As Russia moves to assert itself militarily, the 
potential for increased tensions between Russia and its regional neighbors is 
considerable. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russia’s military doctrine, law on defense pose no threat to anyone – 
Lavrov,” ITAR-TASS, 23 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) “Dmitry Medvedev submitted to the State Duma a draft law establishing a 
legal mechanism allowing the President to use Russian Armed Forces in 
operations beyond the country’s borders,” President of Russia – Official Website 
of the Russian Federation President, 10 Aug 09 via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/news/2009/08/220713.shtml. 
(3) “Russian law on use of troops abroad gets final approval from Duma,” 
Interfax, 25 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) “Senior Russian senator supports bill on use of Russian armed forces 
abroad,” ITAR-TASS, 11 Aug 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) “Russian defense minister welcomes bill on use of troops abroad,” ITAR-
TASS, 10 Aug 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; “Senior Russian senator,” ITAR-
TASS, Ibid.; “Kremlin drafts law on use of military,” The Boston Globe, 11 Aug 
09; via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) “Russian law,” Interfax, Ibid. 
(8) “Dmitry Medvedev,” President of Russia – Official Website, Ibid. 
(9) “Ukraine initiates talks with Russia on amended defense law,” Gazeta, 6 Oct 
09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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(10) “Russia’s New Military Doctrine,” ITAR-TASS, Ibid. 
(11) “Russian pundits divided on bill for deploying troops abroad,” Echo Moskvy 
Radio, 10 Aug 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; “Pundits assess presidential bill on 
use of armed forces outside Russia,” Vremya novostey, 29 Sep 09. 
(12) “Russia to change military doctrine grounds for using nuclear weapons – 
official”, Interfax, 8 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; “New Russia doctrine not to 
rule out preventive nuclear strikes – security chief,” Interfax, 13 Oct 09 via Lexis-
Nexis Academic. 
(13) “Russian security supremo interviewed on new military doctrine,” Izvestiya, 
14 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(14) “Russia’s Military Doctrine,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 Apr 00 accessed via 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00. 
(15) “Russia, USA can agree nuclear cuts only as part of general disarmament – 
pundit,” Interfax, 17 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(16) “Russian security supremo interviewed on new military doctrine,” Izvestiya, 
14 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; “Russian military chief give update on 
conscripts, army reform as call-up begins,” RIA Novosti, 1 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(17) “Russia’s threats sign of “extreme weakness” – Georgian foreign minister,” 
Rustavi-2 TV, 16 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(18) “Ukrainian speaker rules out conflict with Russia over Crimea,” Interfax, 20 
Oct 09; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(19) “Russia foreign minister interviewed,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 22 
Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
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By Creelea Henderson 
 
Gas on paper 
On 13 October, as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao looked on, Gazprom’s Chief Executive Alexei Miller and China 
National Petroleum Corporation’s President Jiang Jiemin signed a formal 
framework agreement for the supply of huge volumes of Russian natural gas to 
China. (1) The agreement set the major terms and conditions for natural gas 
deliveries, and included a multi-billion dollar provision to build two natural gas 
pipelines to China from gas fields in Russia’s Far East. (2) The terms of the 
agreement anticipate Russian gas exports of up to 70 billion cubic meters 
annually, starting as soon as 2014, a volume that would make China the biggest 
customer of Russia’s natural gas. (3) Putin touted the framework agreement as 
forging a new stage in the two countries’ strategic partnership, founded primarily 
on energy relations, noting that: “China is a colossal market. The diversification 
of supplies is a very important direction for Gazprom.” (4) But the upbeat rhetoric 
surrounding the deal could not disguise the fact that the two sides are still left 
holding something less than a legally binding contract. 
 
In fact, this agreement was only the latest in a series of Agreements of Strategic 
Cooperation dating back to 2004, when the two sides opened discussions aimed 
at securing Russian natural gas deliveries to China. (5) Each new accord, in turn, 
has run up against seemingly intractable disagreements over price. Gazprom 
insists that its gas should be priced according to a formula based on the crude oil 
index, a virtual guarantee that Gazprom will receive the same high price it 
charges its European customers. China has held out for a deep discount. Now, 
under the new framework, the two sides have committed to come to an 
agreement by the beginning of next year. (6) There are a number of compelling 
reasons why Russia might want to push ahead with the deal, but whether those 
reasons are compelling enough to overcome several stubborn obstacles, 
remains to be seen. 
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Our gas is your gas! Or, why the deal may go forward: 
The reasons why a supply contract with China may be attractive are fairly 
obvious. China is famously cash rich at a moment in history when Russia is cash 
poor. Declining demand for Russian gas in Europe in combination with 
depressed oil prices has left Russia in straightened circumstances at a time 
when the country’s energy industry is desperately in need of a giant capital 
infusion, just to meet its existing supply commitments. (7) Also, European 
countries are not the valued customers for Russian gas that they were prior to 
the onset of the global economic crisis, meaning that Russia would do well to 
start diversifying its markets. With an unmatched eight percent economic growth 
this year, China is set to be one of the first countries to recover from the 
economic downturn, and is on track to become the world’s biggest energy 
consumer within five years. (8) Arguably, by partnering with China, Russia has 
everything to gain; even after European economies recover, Russia will be able 
to play interests in the West against those in the East. 
 
The deal also makes sense geographically. Unlike most European countries, 
China shares a common border with Russia so that, unlike in Europe, Sino-
Russian gas pipelines need not run through intermediate transit countries. 
Transportation from the Siberian Kovykta gas field to China’s northwestern 
Xinjiang province would be relatively convenient. (9) The regions where the gas 
fields are located and through which pipelines may pass are politically stable, 
ensuring secure production and transportation. 
 
And finally, a major energy deal is politically expedient for two powers eager to 
issue a rebuff to western nations. Russia and China have joined forces on the 
UN Security Council to block sanctions against Iran in the dispute over its nuclear 
program. Both countries continue to operate in the Iranian energy sector and to 
support Iran militarily. Putin pointed to the two countries’ anti-Western posture in 
comments delivered at the signing of the framework agreement: “A shared 
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stance of Russia and China on certain issues helps restrain some of our more 
hotheaded colleagues.”  (10) A long-term energy contract could provide a secure 
political platform with which to counterbalance Western influence. 
 
Back to the drawing board! Or, why the deal is unlikely: 
Europe, historically the locus of Russia’s cultural and economic ambitions, 
remains so. Evidence of this sustained European orientation can be found in two 
major new gas pipeline projects, Nord Stream and South Stream, which 
Gazprom has committed to build, in order to bolster its dominance in the 
European gas market. Unlike the gas transport system that Gazprom promised 
China back in 2004, the Europe-bound pipelines actually are being built. 
 
Russian preference for European energy markets also may reflect its discomfort 
with regional realignments occurring on the country’s southern border. China did 
what no western country has managed to do when it stepped into Russia’s 
sphere of influence and struck energy deals directly with Central Asian gas 
producers. In December, gas shipments are scheduled to flow from 
Turkmenistan to China via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan through a Chinese-built 
pipeline, one of the very few in the region that does not belong to Gazprom. 
Miller signaled his company’s displeasure at the erosion of its regional export 
monopoly with an emphatic refusal to accept Chinese assistance in constructing 
new pipelines: “Gazprom will independently build gas transportation facilities on 
the Russian territory,” he said. (11) 
 
And finally, Russia may once again put off a gas supply deal with China for the 
same reason that makes such a deal seem almost inevitable: China is growing 
fast. While the country offers lucrative new markets for Russian energy 
resources, it also threatens to strip Russia of its power to control regional affairs. 
Reluctant to feed the growing giant across its border, Russia may continue to 
sign agreements interminably without ever committing itself to deliver. 
 
 19 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Gazprom delegation visits China,” Gazprom company website, 13 Oct 09 Via 
(http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2009/october/article69166/). 
(2) “Russia, China Closer to Mammoth Energy Deal,” AP, 18 Oct 09 Via 
(http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,566220,00.html). 
(3). “Russia and China: An Old Alliance Hinges on Energy,” Time, 15 Oct 09 Via 
(http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1930344,00.html). 
(4) “China, Russia bolster ties with gas, trade deals,” Reuters, 13 Oct 09 Via 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE59C0OG20091013). 
(5) “Gazprom delegation visits China,” Gazprom company website, 13 Oct 09 Via 
(http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2009/october/article69166/). 
(6) “Russia and China will determine a price for gas only in 2010,” Vedomosti, 13 
Oct 09 Via (http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2009/10/13/859342). 
(7) “Gazprom’s investment crisis,” Barents Observer, 27 Jul 09 Via 
(http://www.barentsobserver.com/index.php?id=4615459). 
(8) “Russia and China: An Old Alliance Hinges on Energy,” Time, 15 Oct 09 Via 
(http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1930344,00.html). 
(9) “Gazprom delegation visits China,” Gazprom company website, 13 Oct 09 Via 
(http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2009/october/article69166/). 
(10) “Gazprom Strikes Preliminary Gas Deal With China,” The New York Times, 
13 Oct 09 Via (http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/10/13/business/AP-AS-
China-Russia.html). 
(11) Ibid. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2009 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol16/ed1604a.shtml. 
